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PURPOSE OVER FORMALITY:
PUTTING AN END TO THE CATCH-22
PREVENTING WORKERS FROM SPEAKING
UP ABOUT ERISA BENEFIT ABUSE
LUCAS WALKER*
"Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this
clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle. 'That's some
catch, that catch-22,' he observed. 'It's the best there is,' Doc
Daneeka agreed."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2006, a family-owned construction company hired

Shirley Edwards as its director of human resources. 2 Not only was
Shirley brought on to head the department, she was also
responsible for initially setting it up. 3 Once the department was up
and running, Shirley also participated in the company's health

* The author received his J.D. from The John Marshall Law School, June
2012 and his B.A. from Columbia College Chicago, June 2002.
1. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH - 22 46 (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 50th
Anniversary Edition, 1955). This quote symbolizes the way employees may
react when learning they may face their very own catch-22. In Catch-22, there
was a rule that reasoned a man must continue to fly dangerous combat
missions if he is sane, but the fact that a man was willing to fly dangerous
combat missions meant he was insane. Id. The catch was that a person taking
the proper steps to be removed from the duty of dangerous combat missions
was necessarily acting sane and therefore must stay on duty. Id. There was
basically no real way to be taken off of fighter-pilot duty once a person was
participating, because while a person should be removed if they are crazy,
requesting to be removed meant a person was sane and must stay on duty. Id.
Similarly, once an employee is participating in an ERISA protected benefit
plan and he discovers a mishandling of his ERISA protected benefits, he may
face a catch-22. If they choose to complain about a perceived mishandling or
abuse of ERISA protected benefits to their employer, they may be fired if the
complaint does not adhere to an uncertain level of formality. See King v.
Marriott Int'l., Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (evidencing the
conundrum that employees face when file a complaint regarding an ERISA
protected benefit). However, if an employee does nothing, they risk losing
benefits due to the mishandling and abuse. See Dunn v. Elco Enter., Inc., 0571801, 2006 WL 1195867, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2006) (explaining that an
employer was not contributing to their employee benefit plan as promised
until an employee complained about the lack of funds).
2. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 218 (3d Cir. 2010).
3. Id.
893
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plan.4 While everything was fine for a while, after nearly three
years of employment, Shirley noticed some things that gave her
cause for concern. 5 Shirley noticed that the company seemed to be
abusing the benefit plans in various ways. 6
Reasonably believing that such practices should be brought to
the attention of the company, Shirley complained to upper
management about her findings.7 Shirley Edwards was fired
within weeks of notifying management about what she perceived
as the misadministration of benefits.8
Shirley brought suit against the company alleging that she
was terminated because she spoke up about the alleged
mishandling of benefits, 9 and that ERISA 510 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA 510) protected
her from such actions.10 The district court disagreed with Shirley
and held that ERISA 510 did not protect unsolicited, internal
complaints by employees." The appellate court affirmed the ruling
by the district court and Shirley was left to realize that speaking
up to employers about the mishandling of ERISA-covered benefit
plans could cost a person his or her job.12
ERISA 510 is the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA, codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 1140.13 Throughout this Comment, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
will be referred to as ERISA 510, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary
for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions
4. Id.
5. Id. at 218-19.
6. See id. at 219 (explaining the various violations that Shirley
discovered). Shirley discovered that management was violating ERISA rules
by discriminating against individuals who received the health plan benefits
and presenting false information as to the cost of group health coverage. Id.
Shirley believed her employer was trying to convince employees it was a bad
idea to opt into the benefits. Id. Shirley claimed her employer was using
unlawful, fraudulent means to enroll non-citizens into the ERISA plans such
as providing the insurance company with fake social security numbers. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The court in Edwards broke the circuit-split tie when it ruled that
ERISA 510 did not protect Shirley. Id. at 220. Prior to its decision, the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits held that ERISA 510 does protect unsolicited, internal
employee complaints and the Second and Fourth Circuits ruled that ERISA
510 does not protect unsolicited, internal employee complaints. Id.
12. Id. at 225-26.
13. Id. at 220. The Title 29 numbers do not line up with the actual section
numbers of ERISA because when ERISA was codified there were already
many labor laws in Title 29 making it impossible for the numbers to align.
BENEFITS LINK, http:/Ibenefitslink.com/erisalcrossreference.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2011).
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of an employee benefit plan [or] this subchapter ... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan [or] this
subchapter.... It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge,
fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he
has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any
inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter.

. .

. The provisions of

Section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of
this section. 14
This Comment will address a narrow issue at the center of a
current circuit split. 15 The issue is whether ERISA 510 should be
interpreted to protect employees from being discharged for making
an unsolicited, internal complaint to their employer regarding the
mishandling of their ERISA protected benefits and pension
plans.16

Part II, Section A will provide a background of ERISA,
including the basic legislative history and an explanation of how
and why ERISA came into existence.17 Part II, Section B will
discuss the benefits and protections of ERISA.'s Part II, Section C
will explain the current circuit split with regards to ERISA 510.1
Part III, Section A will describe and analyze the cases and
opinions finding that ERISA 510 protects an employee's

14. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2010). Courts will analyze the language
of this statute in order to determine whether an employee's unsolicited,
internal complaints to his employer regarding the mishandling of ERISA
protected benefits are protected. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 220-22. Some courts
tend to base their rulings on the original purpose of ERISA 510 and some base
their rulings on an analysis of the statutory language. Infra Part III Section AB. The cases involved in the circuit split are: Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that ERISA 510 does protect an
employee's unsolicited, internal complaint regarding ERISA protected
benefits); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
that ERISA 510 is clearly meant to protect whistleblowers, which includes
employees making an unsolicited, internal complaint to their employer
regarding the mishandling of ERISA protected benefits); Edwards, 610 F.3d
217 (holding that ERISA 510 does not protect unsolicited, internal complaints
from employees to their employers regarding the mishandling of ERISA
protected benefits due to what they perceive as clear statutory language to the
contrary); King, 337 F.3d 421 (holding that ERISA 510 does not protect
unsolicited, internal complaints because the statutory language requires more
formal proceedings); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir.
2005) (holding that ERISA 510 does not protect unsolicited, internal
complaints from employees to employers regarding the mishandling of ERISA
protected benefits because while the word "inquiry" lacks formality, more
formality is required than a complaint to a supervisor).
15. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 220.
16. Id.
17. See infra Part II Section A (giving background of ERISA).
18. See infra Part II Section B (noting the benefits protected by ERISA).
19. See infra Part II Section C (describing the background of the circuit
split).
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unsolicited, internal complaints. 20 This section of the Comment
will show that courts focus on the purpose of ERISA 510 when
finding that unsolicited, internal complaints are protected. 21
Part III, Section B will describe and analyze the cases and
opinions holding that unsolicited, internal complaints by
employees are not protected under ERISA 510.22 This section will
highlight the deficiency of the argument that the statutory
language of ERISA 510 unambiguously prevents protection for
unsolicited, internal complaints. 23
Part IV, Section A will make the argument that the statutory
language of ERISA 510 should be interpreted broadly to achieve
its original purpose and to avoid absurd results. 24 This section will
also point out how a broad interpretation benefits employers as
well as employees. 25
Part IV, Section B will compare the way anti-retaliation
provisions of other Acts have been interpreted. 26 This will help
shed light on possible solutions and likely outcomes when dealing
with the interpretation of ERISA 510. Specifically, there is
analysis given of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 and Section 215(a)(3) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).28
20. See infra Part III Section A (giving details on cases holding that
complaints are protected).
21. Id. These courts tend to base their holdings on fulfilling the original
purpose of ERISA 510 and do not get hung up on any intricate analysis of the
statutory language. Id.
22. See infra Part III Section B (giving details on cases holding that
complaints are not protected).
23. Id.
24. See infra Part IV Section A (calling for a broad interpretation of ERISA
510).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part IV Section B (comparing interpretation of other antiretaliation statutes to the split on ERISA 510). Courts regularly compare
similar provisions in order to aid in the interpretation of another provision.
Dunn, 2006 WL 1195867, at *5 (comparing interpretations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to aid in the analysis of ERISA 510); Edwards, 610 F.3d at 22425 (analyzing the court's interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision in the
Fair Labor Standards Act to assist with the interpretation of ERISA 510);
King, 337 F.3d at 427 (analyzing interpretations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and Title VII to help clarify the interpretation of ERISA 510); Nicolaou,
402 F.3d at 327-29 (comparing the anti-retaliation provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Title VII to aid the court in the interpretation of ERISA
510).
27. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009). The
Court expanded the interpretation of the Title VII anti-retaliation provision to
allow for the word "oppose" to encompass a person responding to another
person's question rather than only allowing it to encompass a person
provoking a discussion. Id.
28. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325,
1325 (2011). FLSA states that an employee cannot be discharged for filing a
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Part IV, Sections C and D of this Comment will propose
solutions that take into account the original purpose of ERISA
510.29 One solution is for the U.S. Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to an ERISA 510 case and hold that unsolicited, internal
complaints by employees to their employers regarding ERISA
regulated benefits is protected activity.30 Another option is for
Congress to propose and pass legislation that re-writes or amends
ERISA 510 to clearly protect unsolicited, internal complaints. 3 '
Both of these options would fulfill the original purpose of ERISA
51032 and put an end to the circuit-splitting arguments based upon
the statutory language. 33 A similar example of congressional
action that clearly shows this is a legitimate and reasonable
proposal will be highlighted. 34
II.

BACKGROUND

The Originsof ERISA
In a symbolic gesture, President Gerald Ford signed ERISA
into law on Labor Day - September 2, 1974.35 Senator Jacob
A.

complaint. Id. at 1329. This case centers on whether verbal complaints, and
not solely written complaints, can be "filed" and therefore considered protected
activity under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Id.
29. See infra Part IV Sections C-D (proposing solutions to the circuit split
over ERISA 510).
30. See infra Part IV Section C (proposing that the U.S. Supreme Court
grant certiorari to an ERISA 510 case). This is definitely a possibility, as
evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court previously granting certiorari to a case
to expand the interpretation of Title VII. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
31. See infra Part IV Section D (proposing that Congress amend ERISA
510).
32. See infra Part IV Sections C-D (proposing solutions that take into
account the purpose of protecting the benefits of workers). Statutes should be
interpreted in ways that fulfill the legislative intent of the statute. Edwards,
610 F.3d at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (citing Wolk v. UNUM Life Ins. of Am.,
186 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1999)). Even in the face of clear statutory language,
a statute should not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd results.
Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)).
33. See infra Part III Section B (detailing arguments based on statutory
language).
34. See infra Part IV Section D (highlighting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act). Congressional action altered the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 with the passing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2,
123
Stat.
5.
Lily
M.
Ledbetter,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/peoplellilly-mledbette
r/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
35. Eric Loi, Happy Birthday, ERISA!, PENSION RIGHTS CENTER (Sept. 20,
2010, 10:32 PM), http://www.pensionrights.org/blog/happy-birthday-erisa-0.
The House of Representatives passed ERISA on August 20, 1974, with a vote
of 407 to 2. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT OF
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Jivits, who was an integral part of the fight for pension and benefit
reform, 36 referred to ERISA as "the greatest development in the
life of the American worker since Social Security."37
ERISA was brought about in a non-cynical attempt by
Congress38 to do the right thing by American voters.3 9 For years,
employee pension and benefit plans were at high risk of not being
available when the worker retired, was laid off after several years
of service, or changed jobs. 40
The Studebaker shutdown is considered one of the main
reasons ERISA was created.4 1 In December 1963, the Studebaker
Corporation closed its auto production plant in South Bend,
Indiana. 42 After the shutdown, Studebaker could not fulfill its
pension promises to its workers.43 This was either due to an
inherent flaw in the pension plan itself or to pension plan funds
being mishandled and used instead for new acquisitions.44 Either
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 269 (Regents of the University of California,
2004). On August 22, 1974, the Senate passed ERISA 85 to 0. Id. President
Gerald Ford actually wanted to sign ERISA into law before Labor Day, but
Senator Jacob Javits insisted on a Labor Day signing. Id. at 269-70.
36. WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 1. Senator Jivits was born in New York in
1904 and received a law degree from New York University in 1926.
CONGRESS,
THE
U.S.
OF
DIRECTORY
BIOGRAPHICAL
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=j000064 (last visited
Oct. 12, 2010). He practiced law in New York before going into politics and
returned to practicing law after he retired his political aspirations. Id. Senator
Jivits also served in World War II and was discharged as a Lieutenant Colonel
in 1945. Id. The Senator received the Presidential Medal of Freedom on
February 23, 1983. Id.
37. WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 1. Even though ERISA was heralded as
great landmark legislation that would benefit the American worker, ERISA
surprisingly received opposition from the labor community. Id. at 7-8. Some
unions, including the AFL-CIO, were hesitant to make any changes to the way
they handled pension plans. Id. Employers, less surprisingly, opposed ERISA
because they would bear the burden of ensuring they were in compliance with
ERISA standards. Id. The labor and business communities did not fully
support ERISA until it became clear that the states were looking into their
own pension and benefit reforms. Id. at 13. Neither labor nor business wanted
to deal with conflicting state reforms so they both gave their support to
ERISA. Id.
38. Id. at 15-16.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 3-4. The failure of the Studebaker auto plant in South Bend,
Indiana is a prime example of this type of high risk coming to fruition. See id.
at 51 (describing the ramifications of a mishandled retirement plan prior to
the enactment of ERISA).
41. WOOTEN, supranote 35, at 51.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Congressman John Dent (D-Penn.) proposed that Studebaker could
not fulfill its pension promises due to using the pension funds for new business
acquisitions rather than maintaining the funds for the workers. Id. However,
another theory is that the pension plan was simply flawed in the way it was
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way, the end result is the same. 45 While retirees and retirementeligible employees over age sixty received their full pensions, 46
employees under sixty whose plans had vested were lucky to
receive a mere fifteen percent of the value of their full pension
promise in the form of a lump-sum payment. 47 The Studebaker
workers whose benefits had not vested, including all workers
under age forty, received nothing at all.48
Following the Studebaker shutdown, there were two other
events that helped spur ERISA into existence. 49 First, a
presidential committee report entitled Public Policy and Private
Pension Programsprovided a framework to address the inherent
risk of losing benefits in a private pension plan.50 Second, NBC ran
a special entitled "Pensions:The Broken Promise"that highlighted

the deficiencies of private pension and benefit fulfillment and
helped to put pension reform in the news while reform was being
worked on in Congress. 5 1
put together by Studebaker and the United Auto Workers. Id. at 51-52. Some
believe that United Auto Workers intentionally left the workers in a high-risk
situation knowing the funds would be insufficient in order to push pension and
benefit reform to the forefront of American politics. Id. at 52.
45. Id. at 51-52. Regardless of whether the Studebaker pension plan failed
to fulfill its promises due to mishandling of funds by Studebaker or due to a
purposefully created flaw in the retirement plan, many workers nevertheless
failed to receive their benefits, which helped push pension and benefit reform
into the national spotlight. Id.
46. Id. at 76.
47. Id. Some of the workers who were less than sixty years old had been
working for Studebaker for forty years and received only fifteen percent of
their pension promise in one lump sum. Id.
48. Id. at 76-77.
49. Id. at 80, 184.
50. Id. at 80. President John F. Kennedy created the Committee on
Corporate Pension Funds that drafted the report in 1962. Id. The report
received a harsh critique from business and labor leaders who believed that
the government had no place in setting vesting or funding standards or
involving themselves in any way in the terms of a private employment
contract. Id. at 81. The committee tweaked the report, but maintained the
substance of its proposals. Id. However, the report was still shunned due to
fears of it having an adverse impact on Lyndon Johnson's election. Id. Henry
Ford II, then the CEO of Ford Motor Company, pressured President Johnson
to bury the report after the election. Id. The report was finally released in
1965, only four months after Studebaker shut down, but the White House
refused to acknowledge it. Id. The report still pushed worker-security issues to
the forefront of the congressional agenda and was referred to by Senator Jacob
Jivit's as "the bible in th[e] field" of worker security. Id. at 80.
51. Id. at 184. This NBC program was actually only the third-highest rated
show in its timeslot when it aired September 12, 1972. Id. The next day,
pension experts called it a smear against private business. Id. Two months
after it aired, a conservative watchdog group, Accuracy in Media, attacked it
as being "grotesquely distorted." Id. The program featured workers who lost
benefits due to the mishandling of funds by management, being laid off prior
to retirement, and the shutting down of companies. The Press: Who Decides
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B. What's the Big Deal? ImportantProtectionsand Benefits
Provided by ERISA
ERISA protects the benefits and pensions of workers by
setting minimum funding requirements once the private employer

establishes a plan. 52 ERISA does not require private businesses to
set up pension and benefit plans,53 but once plans are created,
ERISA steps in and regulates them with minimum standards in
order to ensure that the benefits will be available for workers. 54
There are a few facts that help shed light on how important it
is to protect the benefit and pension plans of the American
worker.55 First, as an income source for elder Americans, ERISA
protected employer-sponsored retirement programs are second
only to Social Security.56 Second, there are approximately fifty
million private-sector employees participating in retirement plans
regulated by ERISA.67 Third, ERISA governs plans of privatesector employers that provide severance pay and insurance for life,
health, and disability.58 More workers rely on these ERISA
protected benefit plans than the pension plans.59 Finally, most
at
(Feb.
4,
1974),
available
MAGAZINE
Fairness?, TIME
http://www.time.comltime/magazine/article/0,9171,908437-1,00.html.Accuracy
in Media actually filed a complaint with the F.C.C. on November 27, 1972,
alleging that NBC had presented a one-sided view of private pension plans.
Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 516 F.2d 1101, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The
F.C.C. claimed that the one-sided view violated the fairness doctrine, but the
claim was eventually dismissed. Id. at 1101. The NBC program was narrated
by journalist Edwin Newman and received numerous awards including an
Emmy nomination, a Peabody award, a Christopher award, a National
Headliner Award, and a Merit Award of the American Bar Association. Id. at
1105-06, 1206 n.1.
http://webapps.dol.gov/dolfaq/go-dolDEPT.
OF
LABOR,
52. U.S.
faq.asp?faqid=225&faqsub=ERISA&faqtop=Retirement+Plans+%26+Benefits
&topicid=4 (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 1-2. In addition to the pension and benefit

statistics, ERISA is important because it has had a huge impact on legal
practice. Id. at 2. ERISA goes beyond employee benefit law to impact areas
such as finance, insurance, banking, marriage, real property, and more. Id.
The ABA Journal ran an article urging lawyers to learn about ERISA because
it can impact lawyers even if they do not practice employee benefits law.
William T. Payne et al., ERISA: It's More Places Than You Thought It Could
Be, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 62. The article lists areas such as business law,
disability law or even tort law as being impacted by ERISA. Id. at 63.
56. WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 1-2. Other sources of income include
earnings, public assistance, veterans' benefits and assets such as stocks,
bonds, and certificates of deposit. Sources of Income for Older Adults, PENSION
RIGHTS CENTER, http://www.pensionrights.org/publications/statistic/sourcesincome-older-adults-0 (last visited March 30, 2012).
57. WOOTEN, supranote 35, at 2.
58. Id.

59. Id.
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health care benefits for young working Americans are distributed
through ERISA plans.60
C.

What's the Beef? Background on the ERISA 510 Circuit Split

ERISA 510 is currently at the center of a circuit split6l that
may be headed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 62 As stated earlier,
ERISA 510 is the anti-retaliation provision of ERISA.63 ERISA 510
is meant to protect workers from losing their benefits due to any
inappropriate action by employers. 64
Employees face a type of catch-22 when it comes to ERISA
66
510.65 As Shirley Edwards learned the hard way, employees may
not be protected from discharge under ERISA 510 if they speak up
and complain to their employer about a suspected mishandling of
their benefits.6 7 Employees may also be required to seek a formal
60. Id.
61. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 220-22.
62. Third Circuit Holds Internal Complaints Are Not Protected by § 510,
at
available
2010),
6
(July
ON
POINT
DECHERT
A circuit
http://www.dechert.com/libraryLaborEmployment_26-07-10.pdf.
split is thought to be the most important factor in determining the granting of
certiorari. Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79 VA.
L. REV. 717, 726 (1993).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
64. Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 141 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing
Meredith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 935 F.2d 124, 127 (7th Cir. 1991))
(stating that Congress enacted ERISA 510 to prevent employers from
discharging or harassing employees in an attempt to prevent the employees
from obtaining their ERISA benefits); Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (holding
that ERISA 510 is meant to protect employees that speak out about a
perceived mishandling of ERISA benefits and that if the employee is fired for
speaking out, then the purpose is impossible to achieve). An example of
inappropriate action taken by an employer is the failure to deposit an
employee's financial contributions into an IRA. Dunn, 2006 WL 1195867, at *
1-2.
65. See supra note 1 (explaining how ERISA presents employees with a
catch-22).
66. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 219.
67. Compare Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 (finding that ERISA 510 protects
an employee's unsolicited, internal complaint regarding ERISA protected
benefits), and Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (finding that ERISA 510 is clearly
meant to protect whistleblowers, which includes employees making an
unsolicited, internal complaint to their employer regarding the mishandling of
ERISA protected benefits), with Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225-26 (holding that
ERISA 510 does not protect unsolicited, internal complaints by employees to
their employers regarding the mishandling of ERISA protected benefits due to
what they perceive as clear statutory language to the contrary), Nicolaou, 402
F.3d at 330 (holding that ERISA 510 does not protect unsolicited, internal
complaints by employees to employers regarding the mishandling of ERISA
protected benefits, because while the word "inquiry" lacks formality, more
formality is required than a mere complaint to a supervisor), and King, 337
F.3d at 428 (holding that ERISA 510 does not protect unsolicited, internal
complaints because the statutory language requires more formal proceedings).
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internal or external review of their claim,6 8 which can have a
chilling effect on any employee action.69 However, if the employee
says nothing, they risk a loss or reduction of their benefits through
the suspected mishandling.70
Currently, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits interpret ERISA 510
to protect unsolicited, internal complaints.7 1 These circuits take a
common sense approach in their interpretation and mainly rely on
the perceived purpose of ERISA 510.72 The Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits have decided that ERISA 510 does not protect
unsolicited, internal complaints. 73 The basis of these decisions
tends to hinge on a rigid statutory interpretation that seems to
completely ignore the purpose of ERISA 510.74
Resolution of the circuit split is critical because ERISA
regulates some of the most important benefits available to
American workers. 75 ERISA 510 must be clarified as it is a
significant statutory line of defense for workers seeking to avoid
losing their jobs in retaliation for objecting to pension and benefit
abuse by unscrupulous employers. 76
68. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (noting that the term "proceeding" in
ERISA 510 requires a level of formality that was lacking in an employee's
mere complaint to a supervisor).
69. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,
479 (3d Cir. 1993).
70. McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990)). The court in
McBride held that a former employee could sue under ERISA 510 when that
employee was discharged in retaliation to his opposition to the termination of
a benefit plan. Id. In doing so, the court made the point that, without the
protection of ERISA 510, employers would be able to circumvent their
obligation to provide the promised benefits. Id.
71. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 (finding that ERISA 510 protects an
employee's unsolicited, internal complaint regarding ERISA protected
benefits); Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (finding that ERISA 510 is clearly
meant to protect employees making an unsolicited, internal complaint to their
employer regarding the mishandling of ERISA protected benefits).
72. See infra Part III Section A (detailing arguments based on the perceived
purpose of ERISA 510).
73. See supra note 67 (comparing all of the cases involved in the circuit split
including information regarding the holdings of the Second, Third and Fourth
Circuits).
74. See infra Section III Part B (detailing arguments based on a rigid
statutory interpretation).
75. See WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 1-2 (explaining that ERISA's benefits
include welfare plans which include "severance pay and health, life, and
disability insurance," and pension plans).
76. Lindemann, 141 F.3d at 295 (citing Meredith, 935 F.2d at 127). An
example of an employer abusing benefits occurred when Mariott International
allegedly told an employee to transfer millions of dollars from an ERISA
employee medical benefit account to a general corporate account. King, 337
F.3d at 423. In another case, the Bank of Hawaii allegedly violated ERISA
regulations when dealing with severance, pension and profit sharing plans.
Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 409-10.
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III. ANALYSIS
Employees like Shirley Edwards may believe that it is only
logical for ERISA 510 to protect employees from discharge for
making a complaint to their employer concerning the mishandling
of their ERISA benefits. Unfortunately, for employees like Shirley,
the law can be a confusing and intricate web of reasoning that may
result in decisions that seem to contradict one's common sense.77
This section will clarify both sides of the circuit split by exploring
and analyzing the decisions on each side. The analysis will begin
by detailing the cases that have held that ERISA 510 protects an
employee from being discharged for making internal, unsolicited
complaints regarding ERISA violations. Then a microscope will be
put to the cases falling on the other side of the circuit split that
have held ERISA 510 fails to protect such complaints.
A. Protecting Whistleblowers by Protecting the Whistle: Circuits
Holding that ERISA 510 Protects Unsolicited,Internal Complaints
Look to the Purpose
The first appellate decision to rule that ERISA 510 protects
unsolicited, internal complaints is Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii.7 8
Jessica Hashimoto, an employee of the Bank of Hawaii, claimed
that the Bank fired her because she had complained to
management regarding ERISA violations.79
In Hashimoto, the Ninth Circuit held that ERISA 510
governed the case and protected employees from being discharged
for making complaints regarding ERISA violations.80 Specifically,
77. See supra note 67 (comparing the different holdings from all cases
involved in the circuit split). It is abundantly clear that a lay person may look
at what appears to be two identical situations and find that different courts
will reach different conclusions based on what can come across as confusing
and convoluted reasoning that defies common sense.
78. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411. The plaintiff employee, Jessica Hashimoto,
initially brought her suit in state court claiming wrongful discharge and
breach of contract. Id. at 410. The defendants removed the case to federal
court and made a motion for summary judgment claiming that the state
claims were preempted by ERISA. Id. The district court granted summary
judgment and Jessica Hashimoto appealed. Id. The appellate court decided
that Hashimoto's breach of contract claim was without merit because her
contract with Bank of Hawaii was terminable at will. Id. at 410. The court
then decided that the Hawaii Whistle Blower's Act, under which her wrongful
discharge claim was brought, was preempted in its entirety by ERISA. Id. at
412.
79. Id. at 409-10. Hashimoto made several complaints to management
about ERISA violations between April 1989 and October 1990. Id. Specifically,
the complaints referenced requests from management that Hashimoto
reimburse a former employee with improper funds and a request to use
incorrect calculations in determining an employee's pension plan benefit. Id.
at 410.
80. Id. at 411-12. Plaintiff, Hashimoto, also sought to reverse sanctions
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the court relied on what it perceived to be ERISA 510's purpose
and how the purpose would be destroyed if employees in Jessica's
position are left unprotected.8 '
The reasoning in Hashimoto was succinct. If the purpose of
ERISA 510 is to protect whistleblowers, it does not make sense to
allow an employee who participates in an ERISA plan to be
discharged for blowing the whistle on abuse. 82 That would
obviously go against the entire purpose of the statute, as seen by
the court, and it is clear that the purpose of ERISA 510 was
driving the opinion in Hashimoto.83
It is interesting to note that the court describes an employee
bringing ERISA violations to the attention of the managers of the
ERISA plan as a "normal" first step. 84 It would seem that by using
the word "normal," the court is implying that requiring other
arbitrary formal procedures to be taken prior to raising an issue of
benefit abuse to ensure protection from discharge would be
requiring employees to behave abnormally. This shows that the
court was seeking to interpret the scope of ERISA 510 in a way
that fulfilled its purpose while attempting to avoid any overly
intricate lingual interpretation that could result in impractical
requirements.
Once the purpose of ERISA 510 was clearly determined, the
court admittedly spent little time with the actual language of the
statute. 85 However, the language was not completely ignored. The
court found that the protection of an employee's unsolicited,
internal complaint regarding ERISA violations aligned perfectly
awarded against her in the district court. Id. at 412. The court of appeals
found no abuse of discretion by the district judge in awarding sanctions and
therefore affirmed the sanctions. Id. at 412.
81. Id. at 411. Specifically, the court in Hashimoto held that the purpose of
ERISA 510 was to protect whistleblowers. Id. The court then stated that, as a
fiduciary, Hashimoto is clearly able to bring a civil action pursuant to ERISA
510. Id. The court pointed out that ERISA 510 says that 29 U.S.C. § 1132 is
applicable in enforcing ERISA 510. Id. While the court refused to decide
whether § 1132 limits possible plaintiffs that may bring an action under
ERISA 510, it found that it explicitly allows fiduciaries to bring a civil action
to enforce 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (ERISA 510). Id. It is important to note that 29
U.S.C. § 1132 also expressly identifies participants and beneficiaries as parties
who can bring a civil action. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1). This would also seem to
indicate that employees who participate in ERISA plans could certainly bring
a civil action if 29 U.S.C. § 1132 was ever found to actually limit possible
plaintiffs who can bring a civil action under 29 U.S.C § 1140 (ERISA 510).
However, the fact that ERISA 510 refers to 29 U.S.C. § 1132 as merely
"applicable" and not "limiting" would seem to indicate that it does not limit
who may bring a lawsuit. Id. § 1140.
82. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. (discussing the language of ERISA 510 briefly while focusing
more on the purpose of the section).
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with the language of ERISA 510.86 The court reasoned that raising
the issue of abuse is the necessary first step in "giving
information" or "testifying" and that the normal way to do that is
to approach the managers of the ERISA plan.87 Again, the clear
purpose of ERISA 510, along with real world considerations of how
that purpose would be fulfilled, helped to guide the court's
interpretation of the statute.8 8
The second appellate decision to hold that ERISA 510 protects
unsolicited, internal complaints is Anderson v. Electronic Data
Systems Corp.89 The plaintiff-employee, George Anderson,9 0
claimed that he was fired because he refused to commit acts that
would violate ERISA and reported other illegal acts to
management.91 The court held that ERISA preempted a state
claim of wrongful discharge and, in doing so, held that ERISA 510
would protect employees like George from discharge when
objecting or complaining to employers about ERISA violations. 92
The court reasoned that ERISA 510 broadly prohibited any
discharge or adverse treatment of ERISA participants or

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315. Plaintiff Anderson initially brought suit
against his former employer and four current or former employees in Texas
state court. Id. at 1312. The charges brought in state court were wrongful
discharge, tortious interference with prospective business and contractual
relationships, and infliction of emotional distress. Id. The defendants removed
the case to federal court claiming that ERISA preempted any state wrongful
discharge claims that are based on a refusal to commit ERISA violations. Id.
at 1313. Anderson filed an amended complaint that deleted all references to
ERISA and voluntarily dismissed all complaints against all parties except for
his former employer, Electronic Data Systems. Id. Anderson requested that
the case be remanded to state court and the district court denied the motion.
Id. On appeal, the court was to determine whether the claims asserted by
Anderson were preempted by ERISA and therefore removable to federal court.
Id. The court also had to determine whether ERISA preemption raised as a
defense, as opposed to a complaint, still allowed for removal. Id. at 1315. The
court held that state wrongful discharge claims based on being fired for
objecting to and refusing to commit ERISA violations were preempted by
ERISA. Id. at 1314. The court also held that the ERISA "complete preemption"
doctrine allowed for removal of the case even when the ERISA preemption
claim was only asserted by the defense and not as part of a well-pleaded
complaint. Id. at 1315. The court also held that Anderson did not take away
the district court's jurisdiction when he amended the complaint to delete any
references to ERISA. Id. at 1316.
90. Id. at 1312.
91. Id. at 1315. Anderson claimed he was told to sign off on approval and
payment invoices without the approval of pension trustees and to document
the minutes of meetings he did not attend. Id. at 1312. Both of these actions
violate ERISA. Id.
92. Id. at 1315.
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beneficiaries.93 Discharging an employee for "giving information"
to their employer about abuse of ERISA plans was found to fall in
those broad prohibitions. 94
Notably, these circuit decisions did not spend very much time
analyzing the statutory language of ERISA 510 but this is not to
say they completely ignored the statutory language.95 Instead, it
would seem both courts simply saw the purpose and language of
ERISA 510 as not being at odds with each other.96 In contrast, the
circuit court decisions on the other side of the issue spend most of
their time analyzing the language of ERISA 510 and coming to
conclusions that seem to raise more questions than answers.9 7
B. A Question of Formality: The Other Side of the Split Finding
ERISA 510 Does Not Protect Unsolicited,Internal Complaints

The first circuit decision to hold that ERISA 510 does not
protect unsolicited, internal complaints was King v. Marriott
International Inc. The plaintiff-employee, Karen King, brought a
suit against her employer claiming that she was fired because she
complained about ERISA violations to management while also
refusing to violate ERISA herself.9 8 The court held that ERISA 510
does not protect complaints to management regarding ERISA
violations.99 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on its

93. Id.
94. Id.

95. See id. (using the language of ERISA 510 in the court's analysis);
Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (referencing language from ERISA 510 in the
analysis of the case).
96. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 (concluding that ERISA 510 protected
Anderson from discharge while using the language of ERISA 510 in that
analysis); Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (stressing the purpose of ERISA 510
while also using some of the language from ERISA 510).
97. See infra Part III Section B (analyzing the circuits that have found that
ERISA 510 does not cover unsolicited, internal complaints).
98. King, 337 F.3d at 422-23. Plaintiff originally brought a cause of action
for wrongful discharge in Maryland state court. Id. Defendants, former
employer Marriott International Inc. and former immediate supervisor Karl
Fredericks, removed the case to federal court. Id. The removal was due to
ERISA preempting her state cause of action. Id. at 423. The district court
denied King's motion for remand and granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants due to King not showing causation between her termination and
her objections and complaints. Id. King appealed, claiming that the district
court erred by holding that ERISA completely preempted her state action for
wrongful discharge. Id.
99. Id. at 428. The appellate court vacated the district court's judgment and
remanded for further proceedings. Id. The court was basically saying that
ERISA only preempted King's state cause of action for wrongful discharge if
ERISA 510 protected employee's unsolicited, internal complaints. Id. Since the
court found ERISA 510 did not protect an employee's unsolicited, internal
complaints, ERISA could not preempt the state wrongful discharge claim. Id.
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interpretation of the statutory language. 00
The court concluded that the phrases "inquiry or proceeding"
and "testified or is about to testify" in ERISA 510 serve to limit its
protection to proceedings of an administrative or legal nature, 101
and thus something more formal than a complaint to a supervisor
would be needed to trigger its protection.102 This leaves an
important question unanswered: what exactly is the minimum
level of formality required to gain protection from discharge?
The second decision to come along, Nicolaou v. Horizon
Media, Inc., raised the same question. Chrystina Nicolau brought
a suit against her former employer, Horizon Media, claiming that
it wrongfully discharged her after she brought ERISA violations to
the attention of management. 0 3 However, Chrystina not only
informally complained to management, she brought it to the
attention of Horizon's outside counsel. 104 The attorney investigated
the alleged violations10 5 and, finding the complaints to be valid,
then set up a meeting where he and Chrystina discussed the
complaints with management.106 Soon after the meeting,
100. Id. at 426-28.
101. Id. at 427.
102. Id.
103. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327. Plaintiff, Nicolaou, was hired by Horizon
Media in July 1998 as Director of Human Resources and Administration. Id.
at 326. Nicolaou was fired by Horizon Media on November 7, 2000. Id. at 327.
The violation that Nicolaou discovered was an underpayment of overtime to
employees at Horizon's New York and Los Angeles offices. Id. at 326. This
violation had allegedly been going on for more than ten years, representing a
historical under funding of Horizon's 401(k) plan."' Id. (internal citation
omitted). Nicolaou filed the initial complaint on January 31, 2001, and an
amended complaint on April 24, 2001. Id. at 327. The amended complaint
contained two causes of action for illegal retaliation. Id. The first cause of
action was for a violation of Sections 15 and 16 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and the second cause of action was for a violation of ERISA 510.
Id. Horizon Media filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim and the district court granted the motion on both counts. Id. The district
court held that sections 15 and 16 of FLSA did not make it illegal for
companies to retaliate against employees who bring complaints within the
company. Id. The district court dismissed the ERISA claim because Nicolaou
was seeking damages instead of equitable relief as required by 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132. Id. Nicolaou then amended her complaint to seek equitable relief in
the form of reinstating her position with Horizon. Id. The district court
reconsidered the ERISA claim and again dismissed the complaint. Id. This
time the dismissal was because the district court held that ERISA 510 does
not protect employees who "participate[] in an internal inquiry" and since
Nicolaou only seems to have participated in an internal inquiry, she failed to
state a claim. Id. Nicolaou only appealed the dismissal of the ERISA 510
ERISA claim. Id.
104. Id. at 326, 329. The attorney was named Mark Silverman. Id. at 326.
105. Id.
106. Id. The meeting took place in November 1999. Id. It consisted of
Nicolaou, Silverman (attorney) and William Koenigsberg (president of Horizon
Media). Id. During the meeting it is alleged that Silverman stressed the
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Chrystina received a new job title, lost her previous work
responsibilities, and was eventually fired. 107
The court determined that the word "inquiry" in ERISA 510
refers to an informal gathering or request for information, and
that the meeting with management would fit that definition if
Nicolaous's boss requested the meeting in order to receive
information about the violations.10 8 However, even though
Nicolaous' boss did not request the meeting, the court still found
the meeting constituted an "inquiry", seemingly because outside
counsel was involved.109 This interpretation puts the employee in
the frustrating position of either immediately initiating external
legal procedures or hoping the employer somehow learns of the
violations on its own and then decides to inquire about them. This
would seem to protect the employer more than the employee. Is
that the purpose of an anti-retaliation provision?
The court also explicitly states that the level of formality does
not matter when determining what constitutes an "inquiry" under
ERISA 510.110 However, the court then says that its decision is in
line with King, which held that an inquiry must be more formal
than a written or oral complaint to a supervisor."' So does
formality matter or not? The court in Nicolaou answers by saying
importance of rectifying the ERISA violations. Id. Koenigsberg was allegedly
acting as if he was upset that the information was being brought to his
attention. Id.
107. Id. 326-27. Soon after the meeting, Nicolaous's boss allegedly
announced that he was going to hire a 'real' Human Resources
professional ... that would report directly to him." Id. (internal citation
omitted). Nicolaou was then told she would no longer be the "Director of
Human Resources and Administration" and was given a new title of "Office
Manager." Id. Horizon Media then hired two people to take over Nicolaou's
previous duties. Id. Nicolaou described her treatment during this time as
"professional trashing." Id.
108. Id. at 329-30. The court mentions that the district court concluded that
ERISA 510 and the whistleblower provision (Section 15(a)(3)) of FLSA were
the same. Id. at 328. Therefore, the district court held that only a formal,
external inquiry could be protected as an "inquiry" by ERISA 510. Id. The
appellate court disagreed with the district court and said that the plain
language of ERISA 510 is "unambiguously broader in scope" than Section
15(a)(3) of FLSA. Id. For purposes of clarity and comparison, the relevant text
of FLSA makes it unlawful to "discharge or in any other manner discriminate
against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding . . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The relevant text of ERISA 510 states that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate
against any person because he has given information or has testified or is
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter ... ." 29
U.S.C. § 1140.
109. Nicolaou, 404 F.3d at 329-30.
110. Id. at 330.
111. Id.
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that formality does not matter at all as long as there is more
formality than a mere complaint to a supervisor. 112
The most recent and final circuit decision in this section is
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc. The plaintiff-employee,

Shirley Edwards, as we know from the beginning of this Comment,
brought a suit against her former employer claiming that she was
wrongfully discharged after complaining to management about
alleged ERISA violations.1 13
In the opinion, the court's analysis maneuvered around
ERISA 510's purpose of protecting whistleblowers by claiming the
language is clear and therefore demands a plain interpretation.114
The court splits the relevant portion of ERISA 510 into two
distinct parts. 115 Part one is "given information or has testified or
is about to testify" and part two is "in any inquiry or
proceeding." 16 The court stated that Shirley obviously satisfied
the "given information" language of part one when she complained
to management regarding ERISA violations.11 7 The question left to
analyze was whether she did so in any "inquiry or proceeding."
The court reasoned that an "inquiry" requires a request for
information and since no one approached Shirley requesting
information about ERISA violations, there was no "inquiry.""t8 The
court stated that, in order to be considered a "proceeding", there
must be some formal procedure such as the "progression of a
lawsuit" or the "seeking [of] redress from a tribunal or agency." 119
Shirley's complaints did not measure up to either of these
definitions and, therefore, ERISA 510 did not protect her from
being discharged. 120
Following this interpretation of ERISA 510, an employee
would need to keep quiet about any belief that ERISA violations
were taking place until they were able to hire an attorney or
institute some formal legal procedure to ensure they would not be
fired for speaking out. 121 However, a lawsuit or formal procedure
112. See id. (stating that the court agrees with King, which held that the
phrase "inquiry or proceeding" means there must be more than a written or
oral complaint to a supervisor to garner protection under ERISA 510 and at
the same time stating that formality does not come into play when attempting
to determine if an employee's complaint constitutes an inquiry).
113. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 219 (detailing Shirley Edwards' experience).
114. Id. at 224.
115. See id. at 222-23 (finding that Shirley satisfied the "giving information"
requirement by complaining to her employer and skipping over any analysis of
"testify or about to testify" in order to determine whether Shirley gave
information in an "inquiry or proceeding").
116. Id.
117. Id. at 222.
118. Id. at 223.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. (explaining that if an employee speaks out about ERISA
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would not be required to give protection from discharge if the
employee was simply responding to an "inquiry." 122 Apparently,
the court finds it reasonable to believe that employers may
approach workers to "inquire" about their own ERISA violations.
The choice for employees who want to ensure they cannot be
fired for speaking up to their employer is clear. They may either
bring a lawsuit against their employer or hope that someday they
will be asked if they have any information about ERISA violations
at their workplace. 123 Until then, it would seem best to stay quiet,
stay employed, and hope for the best.
Toward the end of the opinion, the court stated that they
might have found in favor of Shirley had the language of ERISA
510 been ambiguous. 124 Interestingly, the fact that several
appellate courts disagreed on what the language of ERISA 510
required at the time of the Edwards decision lends credibility to
the argument that the language is, in fact, ambiguous. 125
IV. PROPOSAL

In this section, there will first be a discussion on how ERISA
510 should be interpreted followed by an analysis of other antiretaliation provisions. Finally, there will be a proposal suggesting
that either the Supreme Court or Congress should step in and
resolve the issue.
A. Everyone Wins: ERISA 510 Should Be Interpreted Broadly to
Benefit Employees and Employers

The basic rules of interpreting a statute include first looking
to the language of the statute for any plain and clear meaning. 126
Typically, the language of the statute will be conclusive if the

violations to his employer it does not represent the protected action of "giving
information" in an "inquiry," but is instead the unprotected giving of
information without being inquired upon).
122. Id.
123. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring) (listing options
left for a fiduciary under the court's holding including: doing nothing and
risking co-fiduciary liability, making an inquiry and facing retaliation,
bringing the violations to the attention of an external agency and hoping
company superiors do not learn of it until the agency makes the first inquiry,
or taking on the burden and uncertainty of filing suit themselves).
124. Edwards,610 F.3d at 224.
125. See id. at 228 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (stating the statutory language in
ERISA 510 is ambiguous due to other circuit's interpretations of ERISA 510
and other cases within the Third Circuit interpreting similar anti-retaliation
provisions more broadly). Judge Cowen referenced how the term "proceeding"
had been held to be ambiguous in a previous Third Circuit case. Id. at 229.
The term "proceeding" had been held to encompass internal complaints when
the Third Circuit was interpreting the Clean Water Act. Id.
126. Id. at 226.
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words produce an unambiguous result. 127 If the words of a statute
are ambiguous, then the courts should look to the legislative
purpose to determine its proper interpretation. 128 However, even if
the statute is not ambiguous, courts should not allow an
interpretation that goes against any clearly expressed legislative
purpose or one that produces an absurd result. 129
The purpose of ERISA 510 is to protect whistleblowers and to
prevent employers from discharging employees in order to keep
the employees from obtaining ERISA benefits. 130 This is evident
not only from case law but also from legislative history where it is
made clear that, "[T]he enforcement provisions [of ERISA] have
been designed specifically to provide ... participants .. . with
broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the
Act .. .[and] [T]he intent of the Committee is to provide the full
range of legal and equitable remedies available ... 131"
It would seem to go against that clear legislative purpose to
find that ERISA 510 is to be narrowly interpreted in a way that
does not protect employees when they try to prevent ERISA
benefit abuse by inquiring internally about possible ERISA
violation.1 32 Not only does that leave whistleblowers unprotected,
it also makes it easier for employers to withhold ERISA benefits
from employees.133
ERISA is a remedial statute and it should be liberally

127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Disabled in Action v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting U.S. v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994) and Pub.
Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989)).
130. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (stating that the purpose of ERISA 510 is
clearly to protect whistleblowers); Lindemann, 141 F.3d at 295 (stating that
Congress's primary aim in constructing ERISA 510 was to prevent
"unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their employees in
order to keep them from obtaining vested [ERISA] benefits.").
131. H.R. REP No. 93-533, at 4655 (1974) (emphasis added).
132. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (stating how odd it is
that the majority opinion finds ERISA 510 to leave unsolicited, internal
complaints unprotected when ERISA 510 was enacted to protect that type of
conduct in the first place).
133. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (recognizing that if employees' internal
workplace complaints are not protected by ERISA 510, then the purpose of
protecting whistleblowers is destroyed). This leads to the obvious conclusion
that employers would be able to withhold benefits more easily by simply firing
an employee for asking questions about abuse. See generally Edwards, 610
F.3d at 225 (holding that ERISA does not protect an employee from discharge
due to objecting internally about abuse of ERISA benefits); Nicolaou, 402 F.3d
at 330 (recognizing that ERISA 510 allows an employer to discharge an
employee if all the employee does is complain to a supervisor about ERISA
benefit abuse); King, 337 F.3d at 428 (recognizing that an employer is not
restricted from discharging an employee who complains internally about

ERISA abuse).
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construed in favor of protecting the participants in the ERISA
plans. 134 The court in Edwards reasoned that the clear statutory
language prevented it from liberally construing ERISA 510.1a5
However, at the time, there was an even circuit split indicating the
statute was ambiguous and, regardless, clear language does not
36
allow for an absurd result.
Finding that an anti-retaliation provision in a remedial
statute does not protect plan participants from discharge when
they complain about plan violations screams absurdity. Employees
will be less likely to bring any complaints if they know they have
to go through some formal external procedure just to ensure they
can bring suit if they are fired for complaining. 137 Not only do
holdings like Edwards prevent the purpose of ERISA 510 from
38
being fulfilled, they also make for a tense working environment.1
It should be noted that narrowly interpreting ERISA 510
produces an absurd result for employers, as well. Requiring
employees to jump through external hoops in order to protect
themselves prevents the employer from hearing the ERISA
complaint first. 139 If an employee feels comfortable speaking to his
or her employer about alleged ERISA violations, the employer may
be able to handle the issue internally rather than in a
courtroom.1 40 Requiring the employee to undertake unclear
external procedures may make the employee err on the side of
taking drastic steps to ensure protection and expose the employer
to unnecessary legal action.

B. No Freakish Rules: The Interpretationof Title VII and FLSA
Indicate a Trend FavoringCommon Sense Protections
The U.S. Supreme Court recently interpreted the opposition
clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.141 The opposition
clause prevents employers from discriminating against employees
134. IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d
118, 127 (3d Cir. 1986).
135. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
136. Id. at 220-22 (discussing the circuit split); id. at 226 (Cowen, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Disabled, 539 F.3d at 210) (recognizing that statutory
"constructions that produce 'odd' or 'absurd results' or that are 'inconsistent
with common sense"' are to be avoided).
137. Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 478.
138. See id. at 478 (noting that whistleblower provisions encourage a less
threatening work environment for employees because they encourage
employees to speak out about violations without fear of reprisal).
139. See id. at 478-79 (stating that requiring employees to take formal
administrative or legal procedures instead of just talking to their employer
directly prevents the employer from having the opportunity to simply clarify
or adjust their policies without having to deal with any sort of unnecessary,
formal litigation).
140. Id.
141. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 846.
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who oppose an unlawful employment practice. 142
The Sixth Circuit held that one could only "oppose" something
through active, consistent activities and that an employee must
initiate a complaint to be protected. 143 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed and held that an employee could "oppose" something not
only by speaking out about discrimination on his or her own
initiative, but also in answering questions during an employer's
internal investigation.14 4 In so holding, the Court looked to how
the word "oppose" would naturally be used. 145 Interestingly, the
Court referred to the previous rigid statutory interpretation as
resulting in a "freakish" rule.146
The U.S. Supreme Court also interpreted the scope of another
anti-retaliation statue, Section 215(a)(3) of FLSA.147 The Seventh
Circuit previously held that the statute did not protect an
employee's oral complaints because only writings could be
"filed." 148
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's
decision and held that the statute protects a worker's oral
complaints.149 In making its decision, the Court looked to the
purpose of the statute and noted that FLSA is meant to protect
workers and that protection relies upon a worker's ability to file
complaints with his employer regarding FLSA violations.15 0 The
very workers FLSA is meant to protect would be negatively
affected if the Court held that oral complaints are not a protected
form of complaint. 151

Similarly, a rigid interpretation of ERISA 510 allowing
142. Id. at 848.
143. Id. at 850.
144. Id. at 849.
145. Id. at 851.
146. Id.
147. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329.
148. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840
(7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
149. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329. Oral complaints must still satisfy a notice
requirement where the employer understands the employee is expressing a
grievance and not simply making a trivial comment. Id. at 1334-35. The
dissenting opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas,
raises the familiar argument that the phrase "file any complaint" requires
something more formal than an unsolicited, internal complaint. Id. at 1336-37
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1333. FLSA relies on employees to report violations of FLSA
instead of requiring some sort of payroll inspection or federal oversight. Id.
Therefore it is necessary to ensure that employees are not fearful of retaliation
for reporting violations. Id.
151. Id. The Court notes that FLSA was originally drafted to protect workers
who were poorly educated, overworked, and illiterate. Id. It would be harder
for these types of workers to commit their complaints to writing and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt said that these types of workers were in the greatest
need of protection through FLSA. Id.
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employees to be fired for complaining about ERISA violations
results in a freakish rule. This type of interpretation leaves
benefits susceptible to the whims of sophisticated employers while
also exposing employers to unnecessary legal action, and does not
serve the interests of the workers that ERISA 510 seeks to
protect. 152
C. The U.S. Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorariand
Interpret ERISA 510
Similar to the granting of certiorari to interpret Title VII and
Section 215(a)(3) of FLSA, the U.S. Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to interpret ERISA 510. The Court could easily end the
debate in the lower courts by interpreting ERISA 510 as protecting
employees from discharge for making unsolicited, internal
complaints; however, this solution would require a willing U.S.
Supreme Court.153
D. Congress Should Amend or Re-Write ERISA 510 to Clearly
Protect Unsolicited, Internal Complaints
Congress recently amended Title VII by passing the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in response to dissatisfaction with the
result of a U.S. Supreme Court case.154 Congress may also choose
to amend ERISA 510 in response to a case like Edwards. Congress
could step in and re-write ERISA 510 to clearly provide protection
for unsolicited, internal complaints. For example:
152. See supra Part IV A (explaining that ERISA should be interpreted
broadly in order to benefit employers and employees).
153. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1604, 1604 (2011)
(denying certiorari).
154. Joanna L. Grossman, The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
FINDLAW
(Feb. 13, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090213.html. The
Lilly Ledbetter Act came into existence because of dissatisfaction with
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Id. In
Ledbetter, plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter, was suing her former employer, Goodyear,
alleging that she was discriminated against on account of her sex. Ledbetter,
550 U.S. at 618. Ledbetter alleged that she was given poor performance
evaluations because of her sex, and as a result, was paid less than her male
counterparts. Id. The district court jury found for Ledbetter but the Eleventh
Circuit reversed partly because Ledbetter did not timely file her complaint. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ledbetter should have filed
her suit within 180 days of the date that her employer first paid her less than
her male colleagues. Id. at 628-29; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs
Equal-Pay
Legislation,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
29,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html. (covering
the signing ceremony and other details of the legislation, including the
Ledbetter decision it was intended to correct). The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
amended Title VII to allow for a new claim each time a person receives a
discriminatory paycheck, rather than only allowing one claim within 180 days
of the first discriminatory paycheck. Grossman, supra.
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It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, or discriminate against any person because such person has
filed any solicited or unsolicited complaint 155 internally or
externally, or made any inquiry, internally or externally, or given
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to this chapter.
V. CONCLUSION
ERISA 510 should be interpreted broadly to protect an
employee's unsolicited, internal complaints regarding ERISA
violations. This would benefit both employees and employers while
also serving the purpose of ERISA 510 by making it safer for
employees to inquire about suspected ERISA benefit abuse. The
U.S. Supreme Court should grant certiorari to the next case that
comes along in order to end the confusion and inevitable forum
shopping 5 6 resulting from the current circuit split. However, every
day that workers are left unprotected is a day too long. Congress
should act immediately to amend ERISA 510 and remove any
doubt as to its proper application. It is time to end the catch-22
forcing workers to choose between losing benefits and losing a job.

155. The use of the phrase "filed any complaint" is inspired by the antiretaliation statute of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which has been
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to protect internal oral complaints.
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1327.
156. See Nicholas J. Wagoner, 4 Reasons Why the Supreme Court Reviews
Circuit Splits, CIRCUIT
SPLITS
(Mar.
15,
2012,
5:32
AM),
http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/03/back-in-december-i-wrote-a-series-ofposts-explaining-the-importat-role-that-circuit-splits-play-in-shaping-thesupreme-court.html (noting that "circuit splits incentivize forum shopping.").

916

The John MarshallLaw Review

[45:893

